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SEC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR 
PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES SHOULD NOT 




 Advancements in information technology allow information to 
be collected and analyzed quickly within a corporation. As a result, 
technology also allows the quicker release of information to the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)—much quicker than the 
Form 10-K and Form 10-Q releases that are currently required for 
publicly traded companies. Although publicly traded companies 
must also disclose certain significant events in Form 8-K, the 
reporting requirements for publicly traded companies are not 
nearly as expansive as they could be considering the easy access 
these companies have to their business information. Even with this 
in mind, the SEC is well into a reevaluation of Regulation S-K 
primarily because requirements have accreted over time to become 
not just burdensome to companies but also blinding to investors 
who are overwhelmed by the volume of disclosure thrown at them. 
This paper expounds on these arguments and posits additional 
arguments for why the SEC should not expand reporting 
requirements for publicly traded companies. Specifically, expanded 
requirements are associated with high compliance costs; market 
forces already induce higher-quality disclosures; the more 
information companies file with the SEC, the more advantages they 
give to their competitors; and both the liability concerns and the 
doctrinal issues already associated with the current requirements 
will be exacerbated with an expansion of the requirements. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 created a mandatory disclosure system in the United States. Since the 
passage of these laws, the reporting requirements for publicly traded 
companies have continued to expand, especially in regards to Form 8-K. 
Advancements in information technology have allowed for the creation of 
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the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval System (EDGAR), 
Interactive Data Electronic Applications (IDEA), and extensible Business 
Reporting Language (XBRL)—all of which have made it easier for 
investors to gain access to information on publicly traded companies. Even 
though these technological advances have furthered one of the main goals 
of the securities laws—to increase investors’ access to information about 
publicly traded companies—further technological advances should not lead 
to more expansive reporting requirements.   
 This paper sets forth five arguments against the expansion of 
reporting requirements that outweigh the benefit of increasing the amount of 
information available to investors: expanded requirements are associated 
with high compliance costs; market forces—primarily an issuer’s concern 
for both its reputation and the scrutiny placed on it by investment analysts 
and the financial press—already cause higher-quality disclosures; the more 
proprietary information a company shares with its competitors, the more its 
competitive advantage decreases; and both the liability concerns and the 
doctrinal issues already associated with the current reporting requirements 
will only be exacerbated with an increase in requirements. More 
specifically, this article will address the following doctrinal issues: the 
ambiguity of ripeness and, relatedly, how best to articulate a duty to update, 
a duty to correct, and managers’ duties under the Management Discussion 
and Analysis (MD&A) requirement. 
I. THE CREATION OF THE SEC DISCLOSURE SYSTEM  
 The Great Depression and the Stock Market Crash of 1929 provided 
the political momentum for congressional enactment of a mandatory 
disclosure system through the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.1 Congress hoped these new laws would eliminate 
fraud from the market and provide assurance to investors that they would 
receive the returns they expected, which would keep investors from 
withdrawing their capital and the economy from stagnating.2 
 The Securities Act “regulates the public offering and sale of 
securities in interstate commerce.”3 At the time of its passage, it required 
disclosure to the Federal Trade Commission, in the form of a registration 
statement, when a corporation made a public offering.4 Since the passage of 
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the Securities Exchange Act, corporations are required to file registration 
statements with the SEC. The registration statement “seeks to assure full 
and fair disclosure in connection with the public distribution of securities.”5 
Most of the substantive information required in a registration statement 
must also be included in the prospectus, which must be given to investors so 
they can “fully assess the merits of their purchase of the security.”6   
 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted with three goals 
in mind: “to control the trading practices of brokers, dealers, investors, and 
the exchanges themselves to prevent manipulation and undue speculation”; 
to regulate “the behavior of issuers and managers whose stock was traded 
on the exchanges”; and to require “mandatory disclosure requirements for 
certain publicly traded issuers.”7 To implement the regulations authorized 
by the act, as well as to enforce compliance, the Securities Exchange Act 
created the SEC, which is now the sole administrative body in charge of 
enforcing securities laws. A central component of the Securities Exchange 
Act is the imposition of periodic-reporting requirements on corporations 
that: have a security listed on a national exchange (section 12(a)); have a 
class of equity securities held of record by 2000 persons or more or at least 
500 holders who are non-accredited investors and have total assets 
exceeding $10 million (section 12(g)); or have registered securities pursuant 
to a public offering of their securities (section 15(d)).8 Under section 13 of 
the Securities Exchange Act, these corporations must file Form 10-K 
annually, Form 10-Q quarterly, and Form 8-K after the occurrence of 
certain significant events.9  
II. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE REPORTING 
REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES 
 Filings with the SEC are submitted electronically through 
EDGAR,10 which was introduced by Congressional mandate in 1983.11 At 
first, registrants submitted their Securities Act registration statements and 
Exchange Act periodic reports through EDGAR by the physical delivery of 
diskettes or magnetic tapes or direct transmission over telephone lines using 
modems.12 Now, all registrants must file mandated information 
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electronically, which most often occurs by e-mail transmission.13 Filed 
information is usually available within thirty minutes of it being filed with 
the SEC.14 Regulation S-T sets forth the “manner and protocol for making 
electronic filings,” which have the same content as paper-based filings, but 
require different formatting.15 Confidential passwords assigned to each 
registrant ensure that filed information is protected against tampering.16 In 
order to better facilitate “investor decision making, since 2009 the SEC has 
required filings to be pursuant to its [IDEA], which itself builds on a 
software program, XBRL . . . , by which information is ‘tagged’ by 
reporting companies so that users can thereafter sort information according 
to the pretagged code.”17 The XBRL system allows investors to quickly 
compare reporting items across companies.18 These advancements in 
information and communications technologies have become “critical to 
healthy and efficient primary and secondary markets” because they help 
further the primary goals of the federal securities laws: protecting investors 
and promoting fair and orderly markets.19  
 The Exchange Act requires periodic disclosures for certain publicly 
traded issuers. These disclosures were meant to make information available 
to investors trading in securities that is similar in quantity and quality to the 
information made available for public offerings of securities under the 
Securities Act.20  
 A reporting company must file Form 10-K at the end of each fiscal 
year. Pursuant to Regulation S-K, Form 10-K must include audited financial 
statements; a management report; and disclosures concerning legal 
proceedings, conflict-of-interest transactions, and other specified issues.21   
 A reporting company must also file Form 10-Q at the end of each 
fiscal quarter. Pursuant to Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X, Form 10-Q 
must include quarterly financial data, a management report, disclosures 
concerning defaults on senior securities, and other specified issues.22  
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 Reporting companies must file Form 8-K on the occurrence of 
certain significant events. The evolution of this form demonstrates how the 
evolution of technology has impacted the SEC disclosure system. 
Originally, Form 8-K had to be filed “within ten days of the end of any 
month during which certain significant events occurred.”23 These significant 
events included certain events in a company’s operation, such as a change 
of control, the acquisition or disposition of a significant amount of assets, 
and amendments to the articles or bylaws.24 In the late 1980s, the deadline 
for filing Form 8-K was shortened to somewhere between five to fifteen 
days (depending on the significant event) after the occurrence of the event.25 
In 2004, when computer technology could finally support its enactment and 
the financial and accounting scandals of 2001 and 2002 required it,26 the 
SEC issued a rule increasing the number of reportable events to twenty-
two.27 The 2004 rule also shortened the disclosure deadline for filing Form 
8-K to two to four business days after the occurrence of the event.28 
 In addition to Form 8-K, the SEC also requires companies to 
disclose public offerings of securities by the filing of a registration 
statement.29   
 In the early 1980s, the SEC adopted an integrated disclosure 
system, which allows certain companies registering securities under the 
Securities Act to “fulfill many of the [Securities] Act’s disclosure demands 
by incorporating into the Securities Act registration statement information 
from their Exchange Act filings.”30 The integrated disclosure system saves 
corporations a substantial amount of both time and money during 
registration. 
III. ADVANCEMENTS IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SHOULD NOT 
CAUSE THE FURTHER EXPANSION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
FOR PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES 
 During the last two decades there have been dramatic 
improvements in information technology. The SEC’s embrace of XBRL and 
the evolution of Form 8-K reflect these changes. While the reason for 
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2008) (unpublished paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1126816. 
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requiring reporting in ninety-day increments was understandable in a paper-
based reporting system, that justification is no longer reasonable given the 
improved ease and speed with which large amounts of data can be collected, 
analyzed, and presented. But technological capability should not be the sole 
consideration. In fact, reporting requirements should not be expanded any 
further due to high compliance costs, impactful market forces, unnecessary 
loss of competitive advantage, and the exacerbation of liability concerns 
and doctrinal issues.  
A. Compliance Costs 
 The expansion of reporting requirements will increase compliance 
costs for reporting companies. Form 8-K provides an excellent example of 
this. In 2004, the number of events triggering a Form 8-K disclosure 
increased significantly.31 At the time, the SEC calculated that the 2004 
amendments would increase the number of reports on Form 8-K per 
company per year by five, on average.32 They also calculated that each 
company would spend five hours filling out each form, 75% of the time 
spent by the company and 25% of the time spent by outside counsel, which 
charged, on average, $300 per hour.33 Based on the fact that approximately 
11,800 companies filed Form 8-K reports in 2003, the SEC predicted that 
the total costs of hiring outside professionals for all companies combined 
would increase by $22,125,000.34 
 EDGAR, which enables companies to file reports directly with the 
SEC “over the Internet, without the added costs of using third parties to 
submit filings,” has admittedly enabled lower filing costs.35 Still, EDGAR 
and other technological advances have not decreased filing costs enough to 
even come close to eliminating the high compliance costs associated with 
additional reporting requirements. 
 The SEC’s current reporting requirements may already produce too 
much information.36 The fact that “not all, or even most, investors need to 
be well informed for the market to be efficient” supports this assertion.37 
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33 See id. 
34 See id. 
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Furthermore, a rather small portion of reporting companies—only 10% in 
1977—are regularly followed by securities analysts.38  
 The expansion of the scale and scope of securities regulation has 
also created fears that the reporting requirements have become overly 
burdensome for smaller firms.39 As of 2011, the average initial compliance 
cost associated with conducting an initial public offering was $2.5 million, 
followed by an ongoing compliance cost for issuers, once public, of $1.5 
million per year.40 The JOBS Act and the Dodd-Frank Act have helped this 
problem by providing some special accommodations for smaller firms, but 
the costs are still onerous.41 This is cause for concern because strict 
regulation quite possibly has caused, and will continue to cause, atrophy of 
the public markets—currently, “IPOs are down severely, particularly among 
smaller firms, and” deregistering—which a corporation can do if it 
decreases its record holders to less than 300—is common.42 There were 
52% fewer listed companies in 2013 than in 1998 and the number of listings 
on the New York Stock Exchange in 2011 was the lowest in over thirty-five 
years.43 
 Expanded reporting requirements also mean higher compliance 
costs for the SEC. The SEC spends approximately $1 billion a year 
enforcing securities laws44—this figure will have to increase if the SEC is 
forced to spend more time on ensuring and enforcing compliance. 
B. Market Forces  
 Some may argue that, with the exception of over burdensome 
requirements, increased reporting requirements will increase the amount of 
information available to investors, which can only be a good thing for both 
investors and the market. However, this argument fails to consider the 
influence of market forces. There “are a variety of market forces that 
presumptively lead to high-quality issuer disclosure.”45 The reputational 
benefit to an issuer of accurate and increased disclosures and the policing 
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41 See Schwartz, supra note 39, at 349. 
42 Id. at 354. 
43 See id. 
44 James D. Cox, Brainerd Currie Professor of Law, Duke University School of 
Law, Securities Regulation Class (Feb. 17, 2016). 
45 Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11: Public Offering Liability 
in a Continuous Disclosure Environment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
2000, at 45, 52. 
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effect of investment analysts and the financial press are two such market 
forces. 
1. Issuer’s Reputation  
 An issuer’s concern for its reputation in the market can incentivize 
the issuer to disclose both accurate information and more information than 
is required of them under the securities laws. Those issuers who highly 
value the opinions of investors will be incentivized to make accurate 
disclosures because “[a] company that misleads investors risks a lower 
stock price if the fraud is discovered.”46 Furthermore, one way issuers can 
separate themselves in the market is by disclosing information 
demonstrating the high quality of their securities.47 Investors also tend to 
value firms with more publicly disclosed information, so some issuers may 
even choose to disclose more than required by law. This is particularly 
important in the current age of technology, where investors can easily find 
out what information an issuer has disclosed, because once a firm starts 
disclosing certain additional information, it cannot stop—investors will tend 
to assume the worst if it does.48  
2. Investment Analysts and Financial Press 
 Investment analysts and the financial press also incentivize 
companies to release accurate information. Large public companies are 
intensely scrutinized by both investment analysts and the financial press, 
which “makes fraud much more difficult to execute successfully.”49 This is 
especially true in the Internet age, where investors have immediate and 
relatively costless access to disclosed information, which pressures 
companies to be even more thorough and timely.50  
 Regulation FD was adopted in August 2000 “as a response to 
securities issuers’ widespread practice of disclosing certain material 
information directly to industry analysts or institutional investors.”51 
Regulation FD tried to curb this behavior by requiring issuers who 
intentionally disclose material nonpublic information to disclose that 
information to the public simultaneously.52 Regulation FD permits 
companies to publicly disclose material information through social media 
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204 SEC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS [Vol. 15 
websites.53 However, a company that publicly discloses material 
information through its social media websites can only escape Regulation 
FD liability if it simultaneously files a Form 8-K.54 The adoption of this 
filing requirement demonstrates how the expansion of technology has led to 
an increase in disclosure requirements. The adoption of this filing 
requirement also demonstrates why it is not always wise to increase 
disclosure requirements as technology expands. Regulation FD forces 
companies to act “inconsistent with the manner in which companies and 
individuals use social media” because it requires them to simultaneously file 
a Form 8-K every time they update their Facebook status or Tweet.55  
 It is difficult to rationalize increasing reporting requirements when 
there is an alternative—market forces—that organically leads to the same 
result: an increase in the amount of thorough and timely information 
available to investors. 
C. Issues Associated with Sharing Proprietary Information with 
Competitors 
 Disclosure requirements should be considerate of the competitive 
concerns associated with sharing proprietary information because “the very 
information that will enable investors to value the corporation is 
information that can and will be used by competitors and others to decrease 
the value of the issuer.”56 The SEC has admitted as much when it revised 
Form 8-K and stated: “Companies may experience some competitive or 
other strategic costs caused by the requirement to disclose more categories 
of information more quickly than they otherwise may have chosen to 
disclose.”57   
 Courts already permit the publication of material information to be 
delayed for a valuable corporate purpose; in some cases, the corporate 
purpose being advanced is keeping information from competitors.58 
Sometimes courts also take into consideration the effect their decisions will 
have on competition in the markets. For example, in Asher v. Baxter 
International, Inc., investors of Baxter International claimed that their 
shares fell $11 per share as a result of materially misleading projections in 
November 2001.59 Baxter shares fell after it released its second-quarter 
                                                     
53 See id. at 243. 
54 See id. 
55 Id. 
56 Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 
BROOK. L. REV. 763, 848 (1995). 
57 SEC Release No. 8400, supra note 31. 
58 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d Cir. 1968). 
59 See Asher v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 728 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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financial results on July 2002 with sales and profits that did not match 
analysts’ expectations.60 The court stated that what the investors wanted was 
“a full disclosure of the assumptions and calculations behind the 
projections,” but held that this would not be a sensible requirement because 
“[m]any of the assumptions and calculations would be more useful to a 
firm’s rivals than to its investors.”61 A rival can use that information to 
decrease the value of the firm—“[i]nvestors can have the information, but at 
a price: their investment will be worth less.”62  
 Some may argue that increasing the requirements for all will 
balance out any competitive advantage gained by any. However, this 
argument fails to consider the potential loss of innovation. “[I]n an economy 
with greater inherent first-mover advantage,” innovation and risk-taking 
occurs more frequently.63 Therefore, when competitive advantage is 
decreased, firms may be less incentivized to spend time inventing new 
products and processes because they will not receive the economic benefit 
that competitive advantage creates. Firms may even choose to abandon 
profitable projects completely if disclosures are increased because rivals’ 
responses could make the project far less attractive.64 Therefore, increasing 
disclosures could decrease the amount of new products and processes being 
introduced to the market. It could also drastically increase the amount of 
time it takes for new products and processes to be created because firms 
will not invent new processes and products until the costs—which are 
greater when competitive advantage decreases—outweigh the benefits—
which are lesser when competitive advantage decreases.  
 It is also important to keep in mind that increased disclosure 
requirements do not just impact domestic issuers vis-à-vis each other, but 
also impact domestic issuers vis-à-vis foreign issuers. Expanded disclosure 
requirements can decrease the marketability of U.S. capital markets for 
foreign issuers and put domestic issuers at a disadvantage because firms that 
are subject to the U.S. securities laws are forced “to share useful 
commercial information with all of their competitors,” while many of their 
foreign competitors are not subject to the same requirements.65 
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D. Liability Concerns 
 The securities laws “impose significant liability for the production 
of misinformation.”66 They make an issuer liable in both private actions and 
SEC enforcement actions.  In SEC enforcement actions, the SEC can seek 
civil penalties as well as injunctive relief.67 Section 12(a)(1) of the 
Securities Act gives any purchaser a rescission remedy for any violation of 
section 5.68 Section 12(a)(2) gives any purchaser a rescission remedy for a 
material misstatement or omission in a prospectus while section 11 imposes 
extensive damage liability on an issuer when there is a material 
misstatement or omission in their registration statement.69 Furthermore, the 
SEC can bring enforcement actions for fraud under section 17.70 The 
Securities Exchange Act’s Rule 10b-5 imposes both SEC and private 
liability for material misrepresentations and omissions made in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security. 
 In addition to issuer liability, there are a number of secondary 
liability provisions that impose liability upon underwriters, directors, 
control persons, and experts, such as lawyers and accountants.71 For 
example, section 11 of the Securities Act imposes extensive damage 
liability on those associated with a public distribution—absent due 
diligence—when there is a material falsity or omission in a registration 
statement.72 These actors have come to “expect compensation for the 
additional liability risk they are forced to assume as well as the additional 
expenses incurred in carrying out their diligence obligations.”73 It has been 
calculated that the threat of private civil liability accounts for “a sizable 
portion of the underwriters’ spread” in the form of a liability risk 
premium.74 This significant regulatory cost is largely borne by investors.75 
 Lawyers and accountants are also exposed to sanctions if they make 
misstatements directly to investors or “willfully aid an issuer that misleads 
the investing public.”76 The SEC can seek penalties for aiding and abetting 
                                                     
66 Id. at 770. 
67 See Securities Act of 1933 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t (2012); Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012). 
68 See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1) (2012). 
69 See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012); COX ET 
AL., supra note 1, at 485. 
70 See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 485. 
71  See Langevoort, supra note 45, at 51 (issuers do not have the due diligence 
defense). 
72 See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 485. 
73 Id. at 486. 
74 Langevoort, supra note 45, at 45–46. 
75 See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 486. 
76 Langevoort, supra note 45, at 46. 
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under both section 15(b) of the Securities Act and section 20(e) of the 
Securities Exchange Act. Managers are liable in both SEC and private 
lawsuits if they make misleading statements or if they are deemed part of a 
control group responsible for fraud.77 Both section 15(a) of the Securities 
Act and section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act impose liability on 
control persons.78 Furthermore, under both section 20(e) of the Securities 
Act and section 21(d)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act, the SEC can 
prohibit “culpable executives from further serving as an officer or director 
of a publicly traded corporation.”79 It is also important to keep in mind that 
a criminal prosecution potentially attends the willful violation of any 
provision of the securities laws (Securities Exchange Act section 32(a)).80 
 These various and expansive liability concerns have become more 
worrisome since the adoption of Form S-3 (which permits short-form 
registration for large capitalization issuers) and the expanded availability of 
shelf registration (which allows for registration without having to issue 
securities immediately). “Disclosure quality is threatened by the de facto 
loss of opportunity for external due diligence by underwriters and others 
associated with the issuance” in these transactions.81 However, even with 
the many due diligence challenges these transactions create, the liability 
provisions are just as strict and unforgiving as for other, much less time 
sensitive, transactions.   
 If reporting requirements are further expanded, the already 
extensive list of liability concerns will increase. This can lead to an 
undesirable increase in compensations (to parallel the increased liability 
risk), which would impose an even more significant regulatory cost upon 
the capital market formation process and ultimately, investors.  
E. Doctrinal Issues 
 There are multiple doctrinal problems with the securities laws that 
will be exacerbated if the reporting requirements are expanded, including 
the proper articulation of the duty to disclose. This section focuses on how 
to articulate the duty of issuers and other participants to update information 
                                                     
77 See id. at 54. 
78 See Securities Act of 1933 § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77o(a) (2012) (stating a 
defense when a control person “had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to 
believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the 
controlled person is alleged to exist”); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 
15 U.S.C. § 78t)(a) (2012) (stating a defense when a control person “acted in 
good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting 
the violation or cause of action”). 
79 Langevoort, supra note 45, at 54. 
80 See COX ET AL., supra note 1, at 485. 
81 Langevoort, supra note 45, at 46. 
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and how to articulate their duty to correct information. These issues tie into 
a discussion of managers’ duties under the Management Discussion and 
Analysis (MD&A) requirement. Another doctrinal issue discussed in this 
section pertains to ripeness. When do the duties to update and correct arise?  
1. Articulating a Duty 
 The issues that arise in articulating a duty can be seen when 
analyzing the SEC’s duty to update, duty to correct, and MD&A disclosure 
requirement embedded in Regulation S-K. The Seventh Circuit attempted to 
define the differences between the duty to update and the duty to correct in 
Gallagher v. Abbott Laboratories.82 In Gallagher, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) sent a warning threatening severe consequences to 
Abbott Laboratories for deficiencies in manufacturing quality control in 
March 2009.83 By September 1999, the FDA wanted to inflict severe 
penalties and change Abbott’s methods of doing business.84 At the end of 
September, Abbott issued a press release “asserting that Abbott was in 
‘substantial’ compliance with federal regulations.”85 By November 1999, a 
court entered a decree requiring Abbott to remove 125 of its products from 
the market and pay $100 million in civil fines.86  
 The plaintiffs—buyers of Abbott’s securities between March and 
November 1999—argued that Abbott committed fraud by deferring public 
revelation.87 The court held against the plaintiffs, stating that the plaintiffs 
never identified any false statement or any statement made misleading by 
the omission of news about the FDA’s demand.88 The court stated that 
under the periodic disclosure system adopted by the SEC, firms do not 
“have an absolute duty to disclose all information material to stock prices as 
soon as news comes into their possession.”89 Under their reasoning, “firms 
are entitled to keep silent (about good news as well as bad news) unless 
positive law creates a duty to disclose”— when a firm is issuing securities 
or is required to file annual or other periodic reports.90 
 The court drew a particularly sharp line between the duty to correct 
and the duty to update with an example. The court stated that if Abbott’s  
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10-K report had said that Abbott’s net income for 1998 was $500 
million, and the actual income was $400 million, Abbott would have 
had to fix the error. But if the 10-K report had projected a net income 
of $125 million for the first quarter of 1999, and accountants 
determined in May that the actual profit was only $100 million, there 
would have been nothing to correct; a projection is not rendered false 
when the world turns out otherwise.91 
Therefore, according to the Seventh Circuit, in a periodic disclosure system, 
a firm is under a duty to correct unless it is issuing securities, when it is 
under a duty to update its registration statement and prospectus.92  
 There are multiple instances in which a company is under a specific 
duty to correct. When a reporting company makes a statement it later 
determines is misleading, it must correct that statement if the statement is 
likely to be material to investors.93 However, it is not always easy to 
determine what is material to investors. Furthermore, how does one define 
misleading and how misleading does a statement need to be for it to require 
correction? These are difficult questions that reporting companies must 
answer correctly in order to avoid liability. 
 A reporting company may also be required to correct erroneous 
rumors leaked by the company itself or its agents.94 This duty to correct 
raises further questions: how many people does a leak need to reach for a 
company to be under the duty to correct it and how erroneous does the 
rumor have to be for it to require correction? Furthermore, does an issuer 
have a duty to correct erroneous rumors or forecasts issued by third parties? 
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc. provides some clarification as to the last 
question. The Elkind court held that Liggett & Meyers (L&M) had no duty 
to correct overly optimistic projections and forecasts because they were 
solely the product of analysts unrelated to L&M.95 However, the court did 
suggest that “had L&M so involved itself with the analysts’ published 
reports that such reports had the expressed or implied endorsement of the 
company, a duty to correct might have been triggered.”96 Since Elkind, 
many courts have held issuer’s liable for not correcting erroneous 
statements leaked by analysts when they were overly involved in the 
reports.97 However, the question remains as to how much involvement an 
issuer must have for the issuer to be under a duty to correct.  
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 Lastly, reporting companies may also be liable for omitted 
information if keeping this information private makes the information that is 
public materially false.98 Determining when privately kept information 
causes public information to be materially false can be a difficult task.   
 There are just as many questions concerning the duty to update as 
there are concerning the duty to correct. However, articulating the duty to 
update is made even more difficult by the MD&A section of SEC filings, 
which is set forth in Item 303 of Regulation S-K.99 The MD&A section 
requires “management to provide narrative explanations of the financial 
statements” with the purpose of both increasing transparency and providing 
better disclosure to investors.100  
 Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Communications, Inc. demonstrates 
how management may find it difficult to determine what they are required 
to include in the MD&A section of their filing.101 In Panther Partners, 
Ikanos Communications Inc. made 72% of its 2005 revenues by selling its 
VDSL Version Four chips to two of its largest customers—Sumitomo 
Electric and NEC.102 In January 2006, Ikanos learned that there were quality 
issues with the chips and during the weeks leading up to Ikanos’s March 
secondary offering of its securities, Ikanos received an increasing number of 
complaints about the chips from Sumitomo Electric and NEC.103   
 Three months after the secondary offering, Ikanos reached an 
agreement with Sumitomo Electric and NEC—it replaced all of the units it 
had sold (not just the defective ones) at its own expense.104 Thus, Ikanos 
had to report a $2.2 million net loss for the second quarter, causing its stock 
to drop over 25%.105 Plaintiffs brought suit as a putative securities class 
action, alleging in part that disclosures in Ikanos’s offering statement and 
registration statement for the secondary offering were inadequate and in 
contravention of Item 303.106 Plaintiffs alleged “that Ikanos did not disclose 
the magnitude of the defect issue in either the” registration statement or the 
prospectus—it simply cautioned in generalized terms.107   
 The court stated that the SEC’s interpretative release regarding Item 
303 clarifies that the “the Regulation imposes a disclosure duty ‘where a 
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trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is both [1] presently 
known to management and [2] reasonably likely to have material effects on 
the registrant's financial condition or results of operations.’”108 The court 
held that the plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly alleged this because not only 
was Ikanos receiving an increasing number of calls regarding the defect 
from key customers, but the Board of Directors was discussing the issue, 
Ikanos “was aware of the ‘uncertainty’ that it might have to accept returns 
of a substantial volume, if not all, of the chips,” and Ikanos’s 
representatives were meeting with Sumitomo Electric and NEC.109  
 Although Panther Partners seems to be a more clear-cut case than 
most, its definition of what must be included in an MD&A is open to 
interpretation because it can be difficult for a company to determine the 
parameters of reasonably likely and material in certain situations. 
2. Ripeness 
 The second doctrinal issue is determining ripeness:  when do the 
duties to update and correct arise? Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano 
demonstrates the ripeness issues that arise in SEC filings.110 In Matrixx, the 
respondents, who were plaintiffs in a securities fraud class action against 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., alleged that petitioners failed to disclose reports of 
a possible link between its leading product Zicam Cold Remedy—which 
accounted for 70% of Matrixx’s sales—and loss of smell.111   
 “Respondents allege[d] that Matrixx made a series of public 
statements that were misleading in light of the [following] information.”112 
In October 2003, shortly after two doctors presented their findings of a 
possible link between Zicam and a loss of smell at a meeting of the 
American Rhinologic Society (ARS), “Matrixx stated that Zicam was 
‘poised for growth in the upcoming cough and cold season’ and that the 
company” expected revenues to “be up in excess of 50%.”113 In its 
November 2003 Form 10-Q, Matrixx stated that product liability actions 
could materially affect Matrixx but it did not disclose that two plaintiffs 
who had lost their sense of smell after using Zicam had already sued 
Matrixx.114 Furthermore, Matrixx released a press release stating that it 
                                                     
108 Id. at 120 (citing Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 
Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, Investment Company Act Release No. 
16,961, 1989 WL 1092885, at *6 (May 18, 1989)). 
109 Id. at 121. 
110 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011). 
111 See id. at 30–31. 
112 Id. at 33.  
113 Id. at 32–33 
114 See id. at 34. 
212 SEC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS [Vol. 15 
believed “statements alleging that intranasal Zicam products caused [loss of 
smell we]re completely unfounded and misleading.”115 Based on these 
allegations, the “respondents claimed that Matrixx violated § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b–5 by making untrue statements 
of fact and failing to disclose material facts necessary to make the 
statements not misleading.”116 
 Respondents had to “show that [petitioners] made a statement that 
was ‘misleading as to a material fact’” in order to prevail on a section 10(b) 
claim.117 The Court applied the TSC Industries standard of materiality—in 
order to meet the materiality requirement there must be “a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by 
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
information made available.”118 To meet this standard, something more is 
needed than mere reports of adverse events.119 The Court stated that this 
something more does not have to be statistically significant data.120 It “can 
come from ‘the source, content, and context of the reports.’”121 
 When the Court applied the “total mix” standard to Matrixx, it 
concluded that respondents adequately pleaded materiality.122 Matrixx not 
only received reports from medical professionals about patients losing their 
sense of smell after using Zicam,123 but “two plaintiffs had already sued 
Matrixx for allegedly causing them to lose their sense of smell,”124 Matrixx 
was aware of the ARS presentation, and medical researchers had drawn 
Matrixx’s attention to studies demonstrating a link between intranasal use of 
zinc and loss of smell.125 The Court concluded that it was “substantially 
likely that a reasonable investor would have viewed this information ‘as 
having significantly altered the “total mix” of information made 
available.’”126  
 In Matrixx the Court applied the TSC Industries standard of 
materiality in the section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 context. The Supreme Court 
applies this standard in “[v]irtually all cases involving materiality 
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determinations under the federal securities laws.”127 However, this standard 
leaves many questions unanswered:  how does one define a substantial 
likelihood? How does one define the reasonable investor? And finally, what 
does it mean to significantly alter the total mix of information made 
available? Reporting companies are under extreme pressure to answer these 
questions correctly because of the potential for liability. 
 The TSC Industries materiality standard only applies to historical 
facts—it does not apply in cases where the materiality of a misstatement or 
omission concerning a merger is being analyzed, because these types of 
cases concern a fact uncertain of occurrence or, in other words, a 
speculative fact.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson articulated the materiality standard 
for speculative facts. In Basic—which concerned a merger between Basic 
Inc. and Combustion Engineering, Inc.—the Supreme Court held that the 
materiality of a speculative fact depends on the 
“probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of 
the event in light of the totality of the company activity.” . . . [I]n order 
to assess the probability that the event will occur, a factfinder will 
need to look to indicia of interest in the transaction at the highest 
corporate levels. . . . To assess the magnitude of the transaction . . . , a 
factfinder will need to consider such facts as the size of the two 
corporate entities and of the potential premiums over market value.”128  
 What level of interest in the transaction at the highest corporate 
levels must be met to meet this standard? Furthermore, how is “highest 
corporate levels” defined? How large do the two corporate entities have to 
be to meet this standard and how large do the potential premiums over 
market value have to be? These questions demonstrate that the TSC 
Industries standard is not the only materiality standard that leaves many 
questions unanswered. 
 The materiality defenses—truth on the market, puffery, statement of 
opinion, and forward-looking statements—create an extra wrinkle in any 
ripeness analysis. These defenses permit a court to dismiss a materiality 
claim at pre-trial, thus saving a corporation from having to spend the time, 
money, and energy on a full fledge trial before a jury. The truth on the 
market defense applies if there is enough information in the market for 
investors to deduce the statement is misleading.129 What information must 
be in the market such that the truth on the market defense should apply? The 
parameters of this question are still ill-defined.   
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 The second defense—puffery—applies to “ambiguous, 
promotional, or hyperbolic speech commonly known as ‘sales talk.’”130 In 
2008 an investor survey was conducted in which 33-84% of reasonable 
investors surveyed deemed statements material that had been held by a 
court to be puffery.131 Clearly, defining when and under what circumstances 
reasonable investors will expect puffery is not as clear-cut and well-defined 
as courts seem to think it is.   
 Related to the puffery defense, is the defense that a statement is not 
material because it is a statement of opinion. In Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. 
Sandberg, the court concluded that a statement of opinion can “fall within 
the standard strictures of the antifraud provisions.”132 However, it never 
addressed whether statements of opinion can relate to material facts.133 This 
question was answered in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council 
Construction Industry Pension Fund.134 In Omnicare, the Supreme Court 
held that a plaintiff  
investor must identify particular (and material) facts going to the basis 
for the issuer’s opinion—facts about the inquiry the issuer did or did 
not conduct or the knowledge it did or did not have—whose omission 
makes the opinion statement at issue misleading to a reasonable person 
reading the statement fairly and in context.135 
 Under this approach, opinions can be material and cases concerning 
them should be analyzed as omission cases. Therefore, when confronted 
with the statement of opinion defense, the same issues and questions that 
arise in omission cases will arise in these types of cases.  
 As to the forward-looking statements defense, a statutory safe 
harbor in the Securities Exchange Act section 21E coexists with the 
bespeaks caution doctrine. The statutory safe harbor applies if the forward-
looking statement is immaterial, surrounded by meaningful cautionary 
language, or the plaintiff fails to prove that the misleading forward-looking 
statement was made with actual knowledge.136 The bespeaks caution 
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doctrine, which deems a forward-looking statement not material if it is 
surrounded with meaningful cautionary language,137 applies to statements 
made in connection with transactions which the statutory safe harbor does 
not cover.138 It can be difficult for a corporation to determine what causes 
cautionary language to be deemed meaningful.  
 Clearly there are just as many doctrinal issues associated with 
determining when the duty to disclose arises as there are when articulating 
the duty to disclose itself. All of these existing doctrinal issues will only be 
exacerbated if the reporting requirements are expanded. 
CONCLUSION  
 Advancements in information technology have created a world 
where large amounts of data can be rapidly collected, analyzed, and 
presented at lower costs and in less time than in the not too distant past. 
Therefore, while the reason for requiring reporting in ninety-day increments 
was understandable in a paper-based reporting system, that justification is 
no longer reasonable. However, technological prowess should not be the 
only consideration when determining the optimal points in time for 
companies to disclose their performance to markets. This paper set forth 
five arguments that oppose the expansion of, and even support the reduction 
of, reporting requirements: expanded requirements are associated with high 
compliance costs; market forces already induce higher-quality disclosures; 
the more proprietary information a company shares with its competitors, the 
more its competitive advantage decreases; and both the liability concerns 
and the doctrinal issues already associated with the current reporting 
requirements will only be exacerbated with an increase in requirements.  
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